Abelard and Boethius: The Problem of Universals
The medieval problem of the universals posited the question of any idea or thing could be a universal in its being. This was defined by Boethius something that was complete in its entirety, and could not exist in part, that was not in a temporal succession, and that "it should constitute the substance of its particulars that is to say, nothing can be both one being and common to many beings in such a manner that it shares its act of being with those many beings, constituting their substance." However, this was impossible because "the universal is supposed to constitute the substance of all of its distinct particulars, as a whole, at the same time. Therefore, the one act of being of the universal entity would have to be identical with all the distinct acts of being of its several particulars at the same time, which is impossible." (Klima, 2004)
Abelard, however, asked, what is the understanding's common conception of the likeness of things, adding a semantic component to the philosophical analysis of universals. He stated it was the status in what the divine mind conceives of all singulars in abstraction from them. Thus, why couldn't concepts such as nature itself be conceived of in the same way. after all, the abstract nature would not have to be a thing any more than status.
Abelard stated that only universal words could be regarded as the "really existing universals." He was, unlike Boeithus, only troubled by the idea of given that concrete words are meaningful in virtue of signifying concepts in the mind, what about abstractions in language, which give reference to an existence that is mere what he called "being conceived." Such status could not be complete or universal, even if they might have a universal use in language, because they were not physical, continuous things.
Work Cited
Klima, Gyula "The Medieval Problem of Universals," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = .
